Hmm, how about this thought experiment, related to valorising the void:
Imagine we were in 4 billion BC. Right before the dawn of life. Suppose that by pouring bleach into this lake over here (let's pretend no aliens exist, and pretend all life originates from micro organisms in this lake, etc.), it would result no life ever existing (this great epic, this 4 billion year unfolding (full of immense suffering—and let's suppose it's net-negative, with suffering exceeding flourishing and joys), would not happen. And no life would exist forever.) You are a disembodied soul/ghost with a bottle of bleach. Would/should you pour bleach into that lake?
On the one hand, it seems like the right answer is that one should not pour bleach into that lake: one should allow evolution and life to happen, warts and all. It makes for a much more interesting and varied and fantastic Universe, full of Flourishing creatures (even if the only really fully flourishing creatures would only come to exist billions of years later), full of joys and pleasures and desire satisfactions and objective values (and yes, full of suffering and pains and tortures and heartaches).
On the other hand, it seems like commitment to *any* suffering-focused ethic would logically commit you to pouring bleach into that lake and preventing evolution/life from happening (since evolution is stock full of suffering).
Thanks for your comment. If we go by the description of suffering-focused ethics as giving "a foremost priority to the reduction of suffering" (see here: https://centerforreducingsuffering.org/research/introduction-to-suffering-focused-ethics/), then suffering-focused ethicists can differ in their judgments about this case. That is to say, suffering-focused ethicists treat reducing suffering as a key priority, but not necessarily the only priority.
Thanks for your response! What would be implied by "a key priority", exactly? I understood it to mean "the most significant moral consideration", rather than "the only moral consideration or priority". But even if substituted with a slightly weaker meaning, it seems to me plausible that the vast/astronomical amount of suffering through the 4-billion-year evolutionary unfolding would mean that most/all suffering-focussed moral theories would have to say that: yes, we should pour the bleach and prevent the unfolding from ever happening.
Hmm, how about this thought experiment, related to valorising the void:
Imagine we were in 4 billion BC. Right before the dawn of life. Suppose that by pouring bleach into this lake over here (let's pretend no aliens exist, and pretend all life originates from micro organisms in this lake, etc.), it would result no life ever existing (this great epic, this 4 billion year unfolding (full of immense suffering—and let's suppose it's net-negative, with suffering exceeding flourishing and joys), would not happen. And no life would exist forever.) You are a disembodied soul/ghost with a bottle of bleach. Would/should you pour bleach into that lake?
On the one hand, it seems like the right answer is that one should not pour bleach into that lake: one should allow evolution and life to happen, warts and all. It makes for a much more interesting and varied and fantastic Universe, full of Flourishing creatures (even if the only really fully flourishing creatures would only come to exist billions of years later), full of joys and pleasures and desire satisfactions and objective values (and yes, full of suffering and pains and tortures and heartaches).
On the other hand, it seems like commitment to *any* suffering-focused ethic would logically commit you to pouring bleach into that lake and preventing evolution/life from happening (since evolution is stock full of suffering).
Your thoughts? 🤔
Hi there,
Thanks for your comment. If we go by the description of suffering-focused ethics as giving "a foremost priority to the reduction of suffering" (see here: https://centerforreducingsuffering.org/research/introduction-to-suffering-focused-ethics/), then suffering-focused ethicists can differ in their judgments about this case. That is to say, suffering-focused ethicists treat reducing suffering as a key priority, but not necessarily the only priority.
Thanks for your response! What would be implied by "a key priority", exactly? I understood it to mean "the most significant moral consideration", rather than "the only moral consideration or priority". But even if substituted with a slightly weaker meaning, it seems to me plausible that the vast/astronomical amount of suffering through the 4-billion-year evolutionary unfolding would mean that most/all suffering-focussed moral theories would have to say that: yes, we should pour the bleach and prevent the unfolding from ever happening.